Proceeding on petition for writ of habeas corpus by a motorist who had been convicted of driving motor vehicle on a public street while his driving privilege had been suspended and while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that imposition of sentences for driving while license was suspended and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not contrary to statute proscribing against infliction of multiple punishments for single criminal act or omission.
Petition denied.
Traynor, C. I., and Tobriner and Sullivan, JJ., dissented.
Opinion 69 CaI.Rptr. 310, 442 P 2d 366, vacated.
I. Criminal Law €=>1209
Statute proscribing multiple punish. ment is not limited to provisions of Penal Code, but embraces penal provisions in other codes including those found in Vehicle Code. West's Ann.Vehicle Code, § § 14601, 23lO2; West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654.
Criminal Law ~1209
Statute proscribing multiple punishments refers not to any physical act or omission which might perchance be common to all of a defendant's violations, but to a defendant's criminal acts or omissions. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654.
CrimInal Law €=>1209
Imposition of sentences for driving while license was suspended and driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not contrary to statute proscribing against infliction of multiple punishments for single criminal act or omIssIon. West's Ann.Vehicle Code, § § 14601,23102; West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654.
CrimInal Law *'>1209
Proximity in time between criminal acts does not preclude multiple punishment under statute. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654. 5 . Criminal Law *'>200 (1) Statute's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment; and rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against harassment which is not necessarily related to punishment to be imposed, and double prosecution may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654. Code section 14601 (with knowledge of a suspended license) and Vehicle Code section 23lO2 (while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.) He pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for both offenses. Petitioner now assen:s that imposition of sentences for both violations is contrary to the proscription against multiple punishment contained in Penal Code section 654. We have concluded that petitioner's contention lacks merit.
[1] Section 654 provides that "An act fortunately, these formulae are of only or omission which is made punishable in limited utility in the instant case, and we different ways by. different provisions of therefore begin anew with a direct anaIythis Code niay be punished under either of sis of the statute and its application to the such provisions, but in no case can it be facts before us,1 punished under more than one * • *."
The interdiction is not limited to the provisions of the Penal Code, but embraces penal provisions in :other codes as well, including those found in the Vehic1e Code. (Neal v. State of California (1960) [2] To put petitioner's entire adventure into a few words: he drove his car with an invalid license and while intoxicated. Initially, it is temptingly easy to extract, as petitioner urges us to do, the single act of "driving," obviously common to both of the charged offenses, and to apply section 654 to this case on the theory that "driving" was petitioner's only uact or omission." However, to do so would be no more justified than to extract the act of "possession" from a charge of possessing two different items of contraband, an approach long rejected by our courts. (E. g., People v. Schroeder (1968) 451 PAOIFIO REPORTER, 2d SERIES 393, 393 P.2d 705; People v. Brown (1958) supra, 49 CaI.2d 577, 590, 320 P.2d 5; People v. Branch, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 4%, 260 P.2d 27).2 Indeed, section 654 itself makes this distinction evident, since it refers to an act or omission "made punishable" by different statutes. 3 The neutral act of driving, like the mere act of possessing in the foregoing cases, when viewed in a vacuum, is not "made punishable" by any statute.
[3] The proper approach, therefore, is to isolate the var~ous criminal acts involved, and then to examine only those acts for identity. In the instant case the two criminal acts are (\) driving with a suspended license and (2) driving while intoxicated; they are in no sense identical or equivalent. Petitioner is not being punished twice-because he cannot be punished at all-for the "act of driving." He is being penalized once for his act of driving with an invalid license and once for his independent act of driving while intoxicated. 4 Moreover, we must not confuse simultaneity with identity: in both of the above situations-driving as in this case and pos- session of contraband in the cited casesthe defendant committed two simultaneous criminal acts, which coincidentally had in common an identical noncriminal act. The two simultaneous criminal acts of possessing substance X and possessing substance Y share the common, "neutral" act of possessing, just as they necessarily share the common factor of lack of a valid prescription for the drugs. Likewise, the two simultaneous-but distinct--criminal acts of driving with a suspended license and driving while intoxicated share the common, noncriminal act of driving. Aside from the dubious vitality of this dictum (see People v. Collin. (1963) 220 CaI.App.2d 563, 579, 83 Cal.Rptr. 638). "essentiality" in and of itself was and is not a sufficient test of the applicability of section 654. On closer scrutiny. in fact, the quoted statement itself presupposes the existence of a single ("same") act; and we have seen that the only single acts that are would be violated not by the one, noncriminal act of being ill a public place but necessarily by three simultaneous though separate criminal acts. Once again, we must distinguish idetl·tical noncriminal acts from simultaneous criminal acts umade punishable" by law."
[4] In attempting to equate simultaneity with identity, petitioner argues that "There was no evid€~nce his driving without a license precedl~d the commencement of the driving while under. the influence." Thus if petitioner had begun driving while intoxicated at 11 :50 p. m., and at midnight his license had expired but he had continued to drive, he apparently would concede that he could be punished for the two distinct acts of driving while intoxicated (before midnight) and driving with an expired license (after midnight). This arbitrary and wholly artificial distinction is unpersuasive. While separation in time may, in some contexts, make the legal separation of acts mc're apparent (see, e. g., In re Ward (1%6) Section 654 of the Penal Code provides that "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this c:ode may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one." Underlying this deceptively simple language is a legislative determination that essential1y unitary c:riminal activity shall not be punished more than once regardless of how many distinct crimes it may comprise. The statute "has been applied not only where there was but one 'act' in the ordinary sense * :+ * but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of section 65 . . 1.." (People v. Brown (1958) Of course, had petitioner been convicted of a "crime" of being intoxicated and a "crime" of knowing that his driving privilege was suspended, the possession cases would be in point, and section 654 would not preclude punishing petitioner for both offenses even though he committed them simultaneously, In such a case there would person." The decisions mention the different public purposes served by the two statutes violated by the respective defendants, but they do not purport to announce a "distinct evils" test contrary to section 654.
Since possession of a physical object is an "act" within the menning of section 654, the defendant who possesses two different kinds of contraband in violation of two different statutes is committing two different "acts" of proscribed possession.
The and it authorizes the courts in their discretion to impose multiple punishments for others (e. g., the familiar statutory provision that a crime is punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both). The Legislature could also, if it saw fit to do so, expressly command or authorize mUltiple sentences for a group of crimes, however closely they might be related. Instead, the California Legislature, so far as multiple sentences for related crimes are concerned. has seen fit to enact the general multiple punishment preclusion of section 654. Cal.2d 577, 591. 320 P.2d 5. 14. the com· ment thnt "Section 654 hus been applied not only where there was but one 'set' in the ordinary sense * * * but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of section 654." Neither Neal nor Brown presented any question of a "divisible" transaction. In each of those cases one factually indivisible act was a common element of defendant's violation of two statutes. In Neal the defendant threw and ignited gasoline with intent to and did commit both arson and attempted murder. In Brown the defendant's act that was intended to abort L also killed her. In both cases section 654 forbade sentencing the defendant for the two crimes committed by the one act, and there was no occasion to inquire whether his offenses were or were not "incident to one objective."
Other decisions cited in Neal and Brown, however, show that Neal's "intent and objective" test should guide the sentencing judge in cases presenting a "course of action" or Htransaction" that, by oversubtle division of the evidence v. Kehoe (1949) 555, 562, 191 P .2d 1.) In such cases the sentencing court is confronted with a state of facts that may or may not come within "the meaning of section 654" in the sense that, although section 654 does not give a comprehensive or definitive rule enabling the solution of all multiple sentencing problems, it does indicate a general legislative purpose of lenity so far as the multiplication of sentences is concerned. Sometimes (as in Greer) the statutes defining the separate crimes in themselves will enable the court to ascertain the legislative purpose that they should not be separately punished, without resort to section 654. If, however, there remains a doubt as to the legislative purpose concerning the multiplication of sentences, the doubt should be resolved in favor of lenity. (In re Tartar (1959) There is no such arguable question in of the defendant's intent and objective as this case. Even if th,erc were, Neal would determinative just as it is wholly anomalous support petitioner, for he had only the to seize on the innocence of the act common single intent and oje(:tive to get from one to both crimes as determinative. It is a place to another. Th(~re is nothing in Neal strange inversion that a defendant who to indicate that the intent and objective of commits an act that is the essential and the defendant must he criminal before it may be deemed relevant in determining whether a course of criminal conduct .is not divisible So as to give rise to no mor~ than one act within the meaning of section 654. Although the Neal case and the cases following it involved criminal intents and objectives (see cases cited in footnote 6, supra), that fact is not controlling. It is wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence forbids splitting a course of conduct into multiple violations {If the sume statute whenever there is El doubt os to the propriety of such frllgmcntation. (In re Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 393, 04 Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393.) Neartt "intent and objcctivc" test also governs sentencing in cases of multiple convictions for both nn inchoate crime (e. g., burglary, conspiracy, solicitation, and like offenses that in fact and by definition are committ.oxI not ns ends in themselves but as preparation for the consummation of a further criminal purpose) and substanthe crimes committed in execution of tbfl inchoate purpose. There may be no single external "act" necessarily common to the preparatory offense Rnd the ultimate offense to bring the CRse precisely within the preclUsion of section 654, but by applicntion of the I·intent and objective" test the legislative purpose exprem;:ed by that section is effected. Illustrating this application of Neal are People v. l\IcFarlnnd (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 760-762, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (burglary with intent to commit larceny and the larceny); Pcocrucial element of two crimes can be punished twice if that act by itself is i;mocent or the defendant's intent and objective are innocent but can be punished only once if the common act or the intent and objective are criminal.
TOBRINER and SULLIVAN, JJ.. concur.
